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The unconditional security of continuous-variable quantum key distribution is established for all schemes
based on the estimation of the channel loss and excess noise. It is proved that, in the limit of large keys,
Gaussian attacks are asymptotically optimal among the most general (coherent) attacks, where the transmission
is tapped using arbitrary ancillas and stored in a quantum memory as a whole. Then, it is shown that the
previously derived bounds on the achievable secret key rates against collective attacks remain asymptotically
valid for arbitrary coherent attacks.
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Quantum key distribution (QKD) is probably to date the
most successful application of quantum information sciences.
This technique [1], based on the transmission of quantum sig-
nals between two authorized parties (Alice and Bob), enables
them to generate a random bit string, called secret key, which
is provably unknown to an eavesdropper (Eve) with arbitrary
computational and technological power. The secret key rateK
is essentially given by the difference between Eve and Bob’s
uncertainties about the data sent by Alice. Denoting Alice,
Bob, and Eve’s classical variables (after measurement) by a,
b, and e, one has
K = H(a|e)−H(a|b), (1)
where the exact definition of the conditional entropy H de-
pends on the type of attacks considered: individual, collective
or coherent. The second term of the r.h.s. of Eq. (1) is sim-
ply measured while running the protocol since it is accessible
to the legitimate parties, so only the first term needs to be
estimated, or, more precisely, bounded below. For individual
attacks,H(a|e) denotes Shannon conditional entropy, and can
be calculated explicitly for a Gaussian attack. For collective
attacks, it must be replaced by S(a|E), which denotes von
Neumann conditional entropy and can again be computed ex-
actly for a Gaussian attack. Physically, this means that Eve
accesses the Holevo information about Alice’s variable a by
making an appropriate measurement on her quantum system
E (instead of accessing the Shannon information between a
and her measurement e). For individual and collective attacks,
Gaussian attacks have been proved to be optimal [2, 3, 4] as
they minimize H(a|e) and S(a|E) for a given channel trans-
mission and excess noise, which largely simplifies the security
analysis.
To address unconditional security, one must consider the
most general class of attacks, namely coherent attacks, and the
first term of the r.h.s. of Eq. (1) must be replaced by the quan-
tum smooth min-entropy Sǫmin(a|E), as introduced in [5]. The
min-entropy (or Re´nyi entropy of parameter ∞) is particu-
larly relevant for the security study of cryptographic protocols
as it quantifies the guessing probability, i.e., the probability
that Eve correctly guesses the value of the classical variable
a [6]. Replacing Shannon or von Neumann entropies by min-
entropies encapsulates the idea that the entire transmission,
made of n symbols, is tapped as a whole. The min-entropy can
be viewed as a one-shot quantity, while Shannon or von Neu-
mann entropies are computed on a single-symbol basis and
get a meaning only by assuming that there are many identical
transmissions. Not surprisingly, these two types of entropies
become asymptotically equal in the latter case, the quantum
smooth min-entropy of a power state ρ⊗n tending to (n times)
the von Neumann entropy of ρ in the limit n→∞.
QKD protocols can be classified in discrete-variable pro-
tocols, based on photon counting (e.g., BB84 [7]), and
continuous-variable protocols, based on homodyne detection
[8]. We will be concerned with this latter class of protocols in
the following, in particular those based on the Gaussian modu-
lation of Gaussian (coherent or squeezed) states. For discrete-
variable protocols, the unconditional security can be proved
by using a quantum de Finetti theorem stating that symmet-
ric states are “close to” product states [9]. An n-partite state
is said to be symmetric if it is invariant under any permu-
tation of its subsystems. If the protocol is symmetric, one
concludes that the smooth min-entropy of the symmetric state
shared by Alice and Bob is asymptotically equal to (n times)
the von Neumann entropy, as used for calculating the secret
key rates against collective attacks. This proves that coherent
attacks are not more powerful than collective attacks. Unfor-
tunately, this approach cannot be applied as such to the secu-
rity of continuous-variable protocols against coherent attacks
as it would require extending a de Finetti theorem to infinite
dimensional Hilbert spaces. Such an extension, however, has
just been shown to hold provided that experimentally verifi-
able conditions are fulfilled [17].
In this Letter, it is shown that there exists another way to ad-
dress the security of continuous-variable QKD, which circum-
vents the need for a de Finetti theorem in infinite dimension.
The idea is to exploit the extremality of Gaussian states with
respect to the (non smooth) min-entropy. The extremality of
Gaussian states has led to powerful results in the past, as it was
2used, e.g., to prove the optimality of Gaussian attacks among
collective attacks [3]. The point of using Gaussian states here
is that even if symmetric Gaussian states are not known to
be exponentially close to product states (although some pre-
liminary results in this direction have been obtained [11]),
their min-entropy is equal to the min-entropy of a well-defined
product state. Then, using the link between the smooth min-
entropy and the von Neumann entropy, one shows that the se-
cret key rate against coherent attacks can be asymptotically
bounded below by a secret key rate against Gaussian collec-
tive attacks. This establishes the proof of the unconditional
security of continuous-variable QKD against the most general
attacks.
Note that unconditional security of QKD protocols can also
be proved by showing their equivalence to some entangle-
ment purification protocols. This strategy can be used both
for discrete-variable [12] and continuous-variable [13] proto-
cols but, unfortunately, does not allow to derive a secret key
rate.
Sketch of the proof. The central object of the proof is thus
the smooth min-entropy Sǫmin(a|E), which we will also often
denote as Sǫmin(ρ) in the following, with ρ being the 2n-mode
state shared by Alice and Bob. As in all security proofs of
QKD, Eve is given a purification of the state ρ, and it can be
proved that the smooth min-entropy is solely a function of ρ.
The first step of the proof is to show that Gaussian states are
extremal with respect to the non-smooth min-entropy Smin(ρ)
as defined later on, that is, Smin(ρ) ≥ Smin(ρG) where ρG
refers to the Gaussian state with the same first- and second-
order moments as ρ. This is proved using a powerful theorem
on the extremality of Gaussian states resulting from a quantum
central limit theorem [14]. Then, one moves on to the smooth
min-entropy, defined as
Sǫmin(ρ) := sup
ρ¯:||ρ¯−ρ||1≤ǫ
Smin(ρ¯). (2)
where ǫ > 0 denotes the smoothness, a parameter quantifying
the quality of the key that can be distilled [6], and where || · ||1
stands for the trace norm. Using the fact that, for a given state
ρ with bounded energy, the function ǫ 7→ Sǫmin(ρ) is contin-
uous in ǫ = 0, we conclude that Sǫmin(ρ) ≥ Sǫmin(ρG) − ǫ′,
where ǫ′ > 0 continuously tends to zero as ǫ → 0. Next,
the invariance of the QKD protocol under permutations of the
exchanged signals allows us to assume that the state ρ is sym-
metric. This property directly translates into the same prop-
erty for ρG, hence of its 4n× 4n covariance matrix Γ, which
can then be written as
Γ =


γ σ · · · σ
σ
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
. σ
σ · · · σ γ

 , (3)
where γ and σ are symmetric 4×4 matrices [11]. The covari-
ance matrix Γ can be diagonalized via an appropriate sym-
plectic transformation S, giving
Γ′ = SΓST = [γ + (n− 1)σ]⊕ Γ′′ (4)
where Γ′′ = n
⊕n−1
i=1 (γ − σ). Since Sǫmin(ρG) is invariant
under S, one only needs to consider that Alice and Bob share
a 2n-mode Gaussian state with this diagonal covariance ma-
trix Γ′. Moreover, since tracing over a subsystem can only
decrease the smooth min-entropy, we get a bound by consid-
ering only a 2(n − 1)-mode Gaussian state with covariance
matrix Γ′′, which turns out to be the tensor product of (n− 1)
individual 2-mode Gaussian states ρind with covariance matrix
γ−σ. Accordingly, we have Sǫmin(ρG) ≥ Sǫmin(ρ⊗(n−1)ind ). The
last step consists of approximating the smooth min-entropy of
a power state with the von Neumann entropy of the state, or,
more precisely, Sǫmin(ρ
⊗(n−1)
ind ) ≥ (n−1)[S(a|E)−δ], where,
for any ǫ > 0, the parameter δ > 0 tends to zero at the limit
n → ∞. This concludes the proof that coherent attacks are
not more powerful than collective attacks, exactly as in the
finite-dimensional case. Let us now proceed with the details
of our proof.
Non-smooth min-entropy. Our starting point is the non-
smooth quantum (conditional) min-entropy Smin(a|E) as in-
troduced in [15]. Remember first that the min-entropy (or
Re´nyi entropy of parameter∞) of a state ρ is defined as
S∞(ρ) := − logλmax(ρ), (5)
where λmax(ρ) stands for the maximum eigenvalue of ρ. We
may then evaluate S∞ for the Hermitian operator
ρAE
σE
:= σ
−1/2
E ρAE σ
−1/2
E , (6)
with ρAE being the density operator on HA ⊗HE character-
izing Alice and Eve’s joint state, and σE being a nonnegative
trace-one operator onHE whose support contains the support
of ρE = trA(ρAE). By taking the supremum of the result-
ing quantity over all nonnegative trace-one operators σE , one
obtains the (conditional) min-entropy of A given E, namely
Smin(A|E) := sup
σE
S∞
(
ρAE
σE
)
. (7)
In the present context, we consider Alice’s system A to be
classical, which boils down to substituting A with the classi-
cal variable a in the above expressions. In the entanglement-
based equivalent picture of QKD, this means that Alice’s mea-
surement is treated as a unitary process and her measurement
device as a physical system, noted a. Thus, a corresponds ei-
ther to a real variable for homodyne-detection protocols or a
pair of real variables for heterodyne-detection protocols.
The next step is to show that the min-entropy Smin(a|E)
of a conditional on E is a well-defined function of the 2n-
mode state ρ shared by Alice and Bob; this property will
then extend to the smooth min-entropy Sǫmin(a|E). Without
loss of generality, Eve is assumed to hold a purification of ρ.
Then, since all purifications are unitarily equivalent on Eve’s
3side and since the min-entropy is invariant under unitaries, the
quantities Smin(a|E) and Sǫmin(a|E) only depend on ρ. Now,
to make both these quantities well-defined, it is necessary to
assume that a is discretized, albeit with an arbitrarily small
step. This is consistent with the actual experiments since any
practical measurement has a finite precision. We note that the
exact value of the discretization step does not matter, as a is
discretized similarly in the second term of the r.h.s. of Eq. (1),
namelyH(a|b), and the terms linked to this discretization can-
cel each other when one computes the key rate. Note also that
the (practical) discretization of a is not contradictory with the
fact that we consider an infinite-dimensional Hilbert space.
Extremality of Gaussian states. Let us show that the min-
entropy is extremal for Gaussian states, that is, Hmin(ρ) is
bounded below by the same quantity computed with the Gaus-
sian state ρG. This is done using the following Lemma [14]:
Lemma 1. Let f : B(H⊗N)→ R be a lower semi-continuous
functional (w.r.t. trace norm) which is strongly superadditive
and invariant under local unitaries f(U⊗NρU †⊗N ) = f(ρ).
Then, for every density operator ρ, we have
f(ρ) ≥ f(ρG)
where ρG is the Gaussian state with the same first- and
second-order moments as ρ.
We apply Lemma 1 to the functional f : ρ 7→ Smin(ρ), with
N = 2 and ρ being the 2n-mode state shared by Alice and
Bob. The three necessary conditions are verified following the
same procedure as in [3], where the extremality of Gaussian
states for the quantity S(a|E) was proved.
(i) Lower semi-continuity. It is known that for two quantum
states ρAB and σAB , there exist respective purifications ρABE
and σABE of these states such that ||ρAB−σAB||1 ≤ ǫ implies
||ρABE − σABE ||1 ≤ 2
√
ǫ. Thus, since f does not depend
on the choice of purification of ρ, it is sufficient to prove the
continuity of f(ρABE) to infer that of f(ρAB). Furthermore,
since partial trace can only decrease the trace norm and since
the operator norm || · ||∞ is a lower bound of || · ||1, we have
||ρaE−σaE ||∞ ≤ ||ρABE−σABE ||1. Hence, one only needs
to establish the semi-continuity of f(ρaE) with respect to the
operator norm.
Note first that, for a given σE , the function ρaE 7→ ρaEσE is
clearly continuous, where ρaEσE is the Hermitian operator de-
fined in Eq. (6). Then, the function ρaE 7→ λmax(ρaEσE ) =||ρaEσE ||∞ is continuous with respect to the operator norm, as
well as the function ρaE 7→ S∞(ρaEσE ) defined in Eq. (5). Fi-
nally, regardingσE as a parameter, the min-entropySmin(a|E)
is a lower semi-continuous function of ρaE , being the upper
envelope of a family of continuous functions, see Eq. (7).
(ii) Strong super-additivity. This property results from the
recombination-chain-rule property of the min-entropy [15]:
Smin(AB|C) ≥ Smin(A|BC) + Smin(B|C). (8)
One has:
Smin(a1, a2|E) ≥ Smin(a1|a2E) + Smin(a2|E)
≥ Smin(a1|A2B2E) + Smin(a2|A1B1E)
≥ Smin(a1|E1) + Smin(a2|E2)
where the second and third inequalities follow respectively
from the subadditivity of the min-entropy [15] and the fact
that A2B2E (resp. A1B1E) purifies A1B1 (resp. A2B2).
The additivity of f(ρ), also needed for Lemma 1 to hold, is a
consequence of the additivity of the min-entropy [5].
(iii) Invariance under local unitaries. This property is
proved following the same steps as in [3]. The crucial remark
is that one can restrict the proof of Lemma 1 to some Gaus-
sification operations that do not mix the x and p quadratures.
Then, using the fact that the min-entropy is invariant under
local unitaries, we infer the same property for f(ρ).
Smooth min-entropy. The function we are actually inter-
ested in is Sǫmin(ρ), i.e., the smooth version of the min-entropy
Smin(ρ), see Eq. (2). Unfortunately, Lemma 1 cannot directly
be applied to Sǫmin(ρ) because this functional is not known to
be additive. Nevertheless, we can use Lemma 1 for Smin(ρ)
and introduce the smoothness by hand in order to prove that
Gaussian states are approximately extremal for Sǫmin(ρ) pro-
vided that ǫ is small enough. More precisely, if we can prove
that the function ǫ 7→ Sǫmin(ρ) is continuous in ǫ for a given ρ,
then one has Sǫmin(ρ) ≥ Sǫmin(ρG) − ǫ′, with ǫ′ > 0 continu-
ously tending to zero as ǫ→ 0.
We address this issue by taking into account a physical con-
straint on the mean energy. We first write
Smin(ρ) ≥ sup
σE∈K
S∞
(
ρaE
σE
)
. (9)
which is analogous to Eq. (7) except that we have restricted
the supremum to the compact set K of states σE of bounded
energy; hence, we have a lower bound. Second, we note that
the function (ρaE , σE) 7→ S∞(ρaEσE ) is continuous in its two
inputs. Then, taking the supremum of a continuous function
S∞(
ρaE
σE
) over the compact set K as in Eq. (9) yields a con-
tinuous function, ρ 7→ Smin(ρ). Thus, in view of Eq. (2), we
conclude that the function ǫ 7→ Sǫmin(ρ) is continuous, as long
as we put an energy constraint in the supremum over σE . As is
obvious from Eq. (9), this energy constraint can only decrease
Sǫmin(ρ
G), so it goes on the safe side.
Symmetric Gaussian states. Up to here, we have proved
that the min-entropy can be safely bounded by assuming that
the state ρ shared by Alice and Bob is Gaussian. Now, let us
exploit the fact that ρ (and ρG) can be considered symmet-
ric (this property can be enforced with a random permutation
of Alice and Bob’s strings after the quantum transmission, al-
though this permutation is not needed for symmetric protocols
such as those of interest here). The permutation-invariance of
ρ (or ρG) implies that its covariance matrix Γ has a symmetric
form, Eq. (3). If a de Finetti theorem held for infinite dimen-
sion, one would conclude that such a symmetric state is “close
4to” a product state. Here, however, we just exploit the Gaus-
sianity of the state. We apply the symplectic transformation
S = 1 2 ⊗ X , where X is any orthogonal n × n matrix for
which Xi,1 = 1/
√
n, in order to diagonalize Γ, namely [11]:
Γ′ = SΓST =


γ + (n− 1)σ 0 · · · 0
0 γ − σ ...
.
.
.
.
.
. 0
0 · · · 0 γ − σ

 .
(10)
Since Sǫmin(ρG) is invariant under S, we may consider instead
of ρG a Gaussian state which has the diagonal covariance ma-
trix Γ′ and is thus a genuine product state. Then, the subad-
ditivity of the smooth min-entropy implies that Sǫmin(ρG) ≥
Sǫmin(ρ
⊗(n−1)
ind ) where ρind is a bimodal Gaussian state with
covariance matrix γ − σ.
Gaussian product states. We are left now with the problem
of estimating the smooth min-entropy of a Gaussian product
state. This is done using the following Lemma, stating that
the smooth min-entropy of a product state asymptotically con-
verges towards its von Neumann entropy [5]:
Lemma 2. Let ρaE ∈ HA ⊗HE be a density operator which
is classical on HA. Then, for any ǫ > 0,
1
n
Sǫmin(ρ
⊗n
aE ) ≥ S(a|E)− δ, (11)
where δ := (2Smax(ρa) + 3)
√
1+log(1/ǫ)
n .
Note that the variable a must be discretized in order to use
Lemma 2; otherwise, the entropies are ill-defined, as already
emphasized. Interestingly, Lemma 2 can be rewritten with
Sǫmin(ρ
⊗n
aE ) and S(a|E) being expressed both as a supremum
over σE , and, in addition, inequality (11) holds for any σE
[5]. This implies that restricting the supremum over operators
σE ∈ K with a bounded energy does not affect the conver-
gence towards the von Neumann entropy.
Finally, applying Lemma 2 to the state ρ⊗(n−1)ind and com-
bining it with the previous inequalities, we get an explicit
lower bound on the smooth min-entropy of the initial 2n-
mode state ρ shared by Alice and Bob, namely
Sǫmin(ρ) ≥ (n− 1)[S(a|E)− δ]− ǫ′ (12)
where S(a|E) is the conditional von Neumann entropy mea-
suring Eve’s uncertainty when Alice and Bob’s state is a Gaus-
sian state whose covariance matrix is γ − σ. Therefore, in the
asymptotic limit n → ∞, the smooth min-entropy is simply
bounded by an expression similar to that used when address-
ing the security against Gaussian collective attacks. This con-
cludes the unconditional security proof.
Note that the secret key rate against collective attacks is
obtained by considering the Gaussian state with the observed
covariance matrix γ, whereas S(a|E) must be evaluated here
based on the covariance matrix γ − σ. Nevertheless it can be
easily computed since both σ and γ are experimentally acces-
sible. In addition, for a QKD protocol with coherent states
and homodyne detection, one can check that asymptotically,
K(γ − σ) ≥ K(γ). This is proved using the fact that the
submatrices in (10) should be valid covariance matrices for
any n. Therefore there is no need to measure σ to establish
unconditional security, but monitoring σ may lead to a better
key rate.
Conclusion. We have proved that the most general attacks
against continuous-variable quantum key distribution proto-
cols cannot beat Gaussian collective attacks, up to some finite-
size corrections which vanish in the limit of a large key size.
Our proof holds for all protocols based on probing the quan-
tum channel via the second-order moments of Alice and Bob’s
continuous data. For readability, we only considered direct
reconciliation, but the generalization of the proof to reverse
reconciliation [16] is also immediate (the result of Bob’s mea-
surement b should be interchanged with a).
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